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I.

INTRODUCTION

Appointed by George Washington in 1793 as ajustice of the
Supreme Court of the United States,' William Paterson was in
the unique position given to a Founding Father. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, he had helped to frame the Constitution under which he exercised judicial office. 2 In the first Senate,
he had been one of the principal authors of the Judiciary Act of
1789, which constructed the Federal judicial system. Indeed, the
first nine sections of the Act, which included the composition of
the Supreme Court and the establishment of the district and circuit courts, were in Paterson's handwriting.' Thus, Paterson was
a Founding Father both of the Nation and of the Federal
judiciary.
Consequently, this study of Paterson's work as a Justice of
the Supreme Court has an unusual aspect. Paterson's influence
on the Court through his work in the Convention and his structuring of the Federal judiciary were more important to the Nation and to the Supreme Court itself than even his substantial
contributions as ajustice. This essay, accordingly, has two parts:
the Convention and the Judiciary Act, and Paterson's work on the
Court.
First, however, a brief look at his roots in New Jersey helps
to explain much about William Paterson. He was born in Antrim,
Ireland in 1745. In 1747, his Scotch-Irish parents came to
America. His father opened a general store in Princeton, across
from Nassau Hall of the College of New Jersey. Paterson was
fourteen when he entered the college in 1759. He studied the
classics and moral philosophy, read Pope and Dryden, was
* B.S., Georgetown University 1950; J.D., Seton Hall University School of Law
1954; LL.M., Harvard Law School 1974; Professor of Law, Seton Hall University
School of Law.
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strongly religious, and saw no conflict between religion and the
rationalism of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. He was anxious
to advance himself and to become a gentleman.4
Paterson was rather short, slight, not handsome, and he
waited fourteen years after college to marry. He was a leader,
however, and he helped found the Cliosophic Society, a social
and debating club, at Princeton.5 After graduation, he read law
in Princeton under Richard Stockton.6 He finally left Princeton,
with misgivings, for a country practice in Raritan. There, besides
being a surrogate, he seems to have spent a great deal of time
handling his father's financial problems.7
Paterson thought that both private and public life rested on
moral virtue, and virtue in turn rested on discipline. The enemy
of virtue was luxury, and Paterson saw luxury in the British monarchy. As a good Calvinist, Paterson saw the people as also
prone to luxury.8 He thought, however, that morals and republican government together would help to keep the citizens virtuous. Even so, to Paterson, government depended upon a natural
aristocracy of virtuous leaders who would seek the public
interest. 9
Paterson was a blend of the moralistic and the practical, an
ambitious and perhaps a somewhat insecure person in his early
years. These personal paradoxes were evident during the Constitutional Convention. A consistent nationalist, Paterson introduced the New Jersey or Paterson plan for amending the Articles
of Confederation; he opposed Madison's Virginia plan, which became the eventual basis of the Constitution.' 0 After achieving
equality for the small states, Paterson left the Convention on July
23rd, when half of the work was still to be done. I I These contradictions seem to fit William Pierce's description of Paterson at
the Convention:
[O]ne of those Men whose powers break in upon you, and create astonishment. He is a Man of great modesty, with looks
that bespeak talents of no great extent,-but he is a Classic, a
Lawyer, and an Orator;-and of a disposition so favorable to
4 SeeJ. O'CONNOR, supra note 1, at 7-19; C. RosSITER, supra note 2, at 99.
5 J. O'CONNOR, supra note 1, at 28.
6 Id. at 32.
7 Id. at 33-34.

Id. at 59-61.
9 Id. at 18-19, 48-55.
10 M. FARRAND, supra note 2, at 84-85.
11 See C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 719.
8

1986]

MR. JUSTICE PATERSON

315

his advancement that everyone seemed ready to exalt him with
their praises.' 2
In spite of these paradoxes, Paterson had a set of consistent
principles and great opportunities. Property and political stability
were sacred to him. 1 3 As a lawyer, Paterson sued debtors, and as
attorney general during the Revolution, he pursued Tories and
fought for political and financial stability in New Jersey.' 4 Paterson
joined his friends and mentors from Princeton in a rebellion against
a monarchy that he saw as luxury-ridden and contemptuous of republican principles.1 5
Paterson represented the middle-class, Presbyterian NewJersey
of the colonial era. He served as secretary to both New Jersey's Provincial Congress and its constitutional convention before being
named attorney general.' 6 In 1787, he was chosen as one of New
Jersey's delegates to the Federal Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia.' 7 The Convention, in the words of his biographerJohn E.
O'Connor, was his finest hour. 18
II.

THE CONVENTION

It was as a politician, lawyer, and strategist that William Paterson distinguished himself at the Constitutional Convention.
Madison of Virginia and Wilson of Pennsylvania were to be the
principal architects of the new Government, not only because of
ability and political principle, but because the interests of their
states coincided with the creation of a strong National Government and with proportionate representation by population in
both branches of the Legislature. Madison, Wilson, and
Gouverneur Morris were determined to institute a national or
consolidated Government that would give the states a distinctly
subordinate role, the opposite of government under the Articles
of Confederation. 19
William Paterson, representing New Jersey, led the coalition
of small states that stopped the large state juggernaut and
12 J. O'CONNOR,
13 Id. at 47-49.

14 Id. at 50, 100.
15 Id. at 45-55.

supra note 1, at 134.

Id. at 71, 77, 84.
Id. at 133-34.
18 Id. at 131. See generally J. POMFRET, COLONIAL NEW JERSEY 218-46 (1973) (explaining social and political atmosphere in New Jersey prior to the Revolution).
19 See generally C. RoSSITER, supra note 2, at 159-8 1; C. WARREN, supra note 2, at
134-200.
16
17
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brought about the Great Compromise. 20 The Compromise provided for proportional representation in the House of Representatives, but equal representation in the Senate. 2 1 It ensured also
that the new Government would be a federal one having a significant role for the states. Indeed, Paterson was later to describe
the Federal system as "sovereignties moving within a sovereignty." 2 2 To political thinkers like Paterson, the Great Compromise was necessary to prevent the demise of small states' rights
and autonomy in the new Government.
Nowhere was this portentous scenario more evident than in
Paterson's home state. New Jersey, having no major ports, had
to import and export through New York and Philadelphia, both
of which laid duties on NewJersey's commerce. Paterson's home
state was, in Madison's words, "likened to a cask tapped at both
ends."' 2 3 New Jersey, like Connecticut, Maryland, and Delaware,
was a relatively small state. Along with those states and New
York, it had no claims to Western territory. If the new Government were to be based on representation according to population, Paterson and others believed, New Jersey could anticipate
that the large states such as Virginia, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and others would subordinate New Jersey's interests to
theirs and would perhaps even destroy the smaller states.2 4 By
contrast, for the large states with significant populations or the
prospect of new Western lands, proportional representation in
the National Government posed little apparent threat to their interests.2 5 In addition, Madison, Wilson, and some of the others
from the large states had backgrounds of national and even international experience, while Paterson had served New Jersey during the Revolution as its attorney general. 2 6
We must analyze Paterson's role in the course of the Convention in order to understand and appraise it. In the first two
weeks, from May 30th to June 13th, the delegates met as a Committee of the Whole while Randolph, Madison, Wilson, and
20 See C. ROSSITER, supra note 2, at 175-79; C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 199, 220-

31.

21 C. ROSSITER, supra note 2, at 186. See generally C. WARREN, supra note 2, at
267-312.
22 Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 154 (1795) (opinion of Paterson, J.)
23 L BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 1787-1800, at 65
(1950).
24 SeeJ. O'CONNOR, supra note 1,at 135-36; see also I. BRANT, supra note 23, at 65
(noting problem of trade for New Jersey and Connecticut).
25 1.BRANT, supra note 23, at 61.
26 See C. RosSrrER, supra note 2, at 99, 101-09, 117-26.
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others formulated the Virginia plan. The plan, largely drafted by
Madison, presented the idea of a national government consisting
of three branches with broad national powers. Of these
branches, the lawmaking body was a two-house legislature to be
chosen according to proportional representation. The plan envisioned a new form of government rather than an amendment to
the Articles of Confederation.2 7
While the different resolutions of the Virginia plan were being adopted, Paterson remained silent.2 8 On June 9th, however,
Paterson rose to object to the proposal for proportional representation. In his carefully prepared speech, Paterson argued that
the body was moving beyond its mandate from the states, which
was to amend the Articles.2 9 More importantly, Paterson stated
that the small states could never agree to the dominance by the
large states embodied in the Virginia plan. Madison's notes recorded the speech and the peroration:
He alluded to the hint thrown out heretofore by Mr. Wilson of
the necessity to which the large States might be reduced of
confederating among themselves, by a refusal of the others to
concur. Let them unite if they please, but let them remember
that they have no authority to compel the others to unite. N.
Jersey will never confederate on the plan before the Committee. She would be swallowed up. He had rather submit to a
monarch, to a despot, than to such a fate. He would not only
oppose the plan here but on his return home do everything in
his power to defeat it there.3 1
Wilson replied that the large states could not agree to representation not based upon population, in which a minority could rule the
majority.3 2 The Committee of the Whole voted on June 1 th to accept the principle of representation in both houses according to
population, but the Convention resolved to take the matter up
again.3 3
On June 13th, a Wednesday, the Committee of the Whole de27 C.

WARREN,

supra note 2, at 146-219; see C. RoSSITER, supra note 2, at 171-73.
supra note 1, at 138.

28 J. O'CONNOR,

29 Id.

supra note 2, at 199-200.
31 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 179-80 (M. Farrand
30 C. WARREN,

ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as 1 RECORDS] (Madison's notes); see also id. at 185-91
(Paterson's notes of his speech).
32 Id. at 183; C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 200.
33 1 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 192-94. See generally C. WARREN,

207-12.

supra note 2, at
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cided to report the Virginia plan to the Convention. 4 Paterson's
intervention on June 9th, however, had initiated a great debate between the large states and the small. The next move by Paterson
was the introduction of an alternative to the Virginia plan-the New
Jersey or Paterson plan.3 5 After obtaining a recess to complete its
preparation, and with backing by New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware, and Luther Martin of Maryland, Paterson presented the plan
onJune 15th.3 6 Essentially, Paterson's plan expanded the powers of
the Confederation.3 7 After several days of debate on the two plans,
capped by a speech from Madison, the Virginia plan was approved
on June 19th by the Committee of the Whole by a vote of seven to
three.3 8 Madison, Wilson, and others had eloquently presented the
Virginia plan, while the New Jersey plan had been thrown together
hastily.3" The small state delegates were united only in their demand for equality.4"
Nevertheless, the New Jersey plan and Paterson's earlier intervention of June 9th had dramatically highlighted the cause of the
small states for equality. From June 21st to June 26th, the Convention took up each detail of the Virginia plan as submitted by the
Committee of the Whole. 4 On June 27th, the debate over representation was renewed by Luther Martin of Maryland in a long, rambling speech. 4 2 OnJune 28th, Dayton of NewJersey and Lansing of
New York moved for equality among the states in the lower
branch.43 Their motion was lost, with Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, and Delaware on the losing side and Maryland divided.4 4
Representation in the Senate was considered next, with Ellsworth of
Connecticut moving for equality and expressing doubt that any state
north of Pennsylvania, except Massachusetts, would consent to anything other than equal representation.4 5 A tie vote ensued on July
2nd, and a special committee was elected to report a compromise.4 6
Paterson, who had remained silent during this debate, was
34 1 RECORDS, supra note 31,
35 M. FARRAND, supra note 2,
36 Id.

at 238-39.
at 84-85.

37 See 1 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 242-45.
38 C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 231-32.
39 See generally 1 RECORDS, supra note 31, at
40 C. ROSSITER, supra note 2, at 176.
41 Id. at 182-84; C. WARREN, supra note 2,

248-322.

at 236-45. See generally 1 RECORDS,
supra note 31, at 334-435.
42 C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 245-47.
43 Id. at 249.
44 1 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 468.
45 C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 255; see 1 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 468-69.
46 M. FARRAND, supra note 2, at 96-98.
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elected to the Committee.4 7 The composition of the Committee
meant that the Convention favored a compromise with the smaller
states. Madison and Wilson were not elected; large state delegates
who were willing to compromise were chosen instead.4" The result,
reported on July 5th, was the Great Compromise: representation by
population in the House and equal representation in the Senate.4 9
After a long debate on other parts of the Compromise-the
number of representatives in the House, the counting of slaves, and
the power over money bills5 0-the Convention adopted the full
Compromise on July 16th. 5 Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, and North Carolina voted yes (New York was absent);
Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia voted no; Massachusetts was divided.5 2 Randolph of Virginia then asked for an
adjournment to enable the large states to evaluate their position,
and he suggested that the small states might also consider a method
of conciliation.5" At this point, Paterson, not one to let the victory
slip away, intervened. He would be happy to second Randolph's
motion for an adjournment for the purpose of consulting with his
constituents, he said, because the small states would never yield
their demand for equality in the Senate.5 4 Randolph replied that he
had never intended more than a day's adjournment. 55 The next
day, July 17th, after inconclusive discussion among large state delegates, the Compromise was left intact, much to Madison's distress.5 6
On this same day, Paterson wrote to his wife, "I expect to be
with you on or about the first of next month and hope that I shall
not be under the necessity of returning." '5 7 Paterson seems to have
had pressing business at home, he was uncomfortable in Philadelphia and avoided the social life the Convention called for, 58 and he
had, as always, one foot in New Jersey. Perhaps he decided to leave
only a few days later on July 23rd because he realized that the work
47 J. O'CONNOR, supra note 1, at 153.
48 1 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 516; C. ROSSITER, supra note 2, at 187; C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 264.
49 M. FARRAND, supra note 2, at 99; 1 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 526.
5o See generally C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 274-308.

Id.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 15 (M. Farrand ed.
1911) [hereinafter cited as 2 RECORDS].
53 Id. at 17-18.
54 J. O'CONNOR, supra note 1, at 156-58.
55 Id. at 158; C. RossrrER, supra note 2, at 194-95.
56 See C. RossrrER, supra note 2, at 192-94; C. WARREN, supra note 2,at 313.
57 4 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 70 (M. Farrand rev.
ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as 4 RECORDS]; seeJ. O'CONNOR, supra note 1, at 160.
58 SeeJ. O'CONNOR, supra note 1, at 160-61.
51

52
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of the Convention would take some weeks more. Nevertheless, he
returned on September 17th to sign the proposed Constitution.5 9
Despite persistent impressions to the contrary, which are attributable in part to Madison's notes ofJuly 7th, it seems clear that Paterson supported the Great Compromise.60 Above all, he was
satisfied with the work of the Convention. In the letter ofJuly 17th
to his wife, Paterson also wrote, "The business is difficult and unavoidably takes up much time, but I think we shall eventually agree
upon and adopt a system that will give strength and harmony to the
Union and render us a great and happy people."6 For Paterson at
that time, the principles had been settled upon to his satisfaction,
and only the detail remained. In an August 23rd letter to Oliver
Ellsworth, he stated:
What are the Convention about? When will they rise? will
[sic] they agree upon a System energetick [sic] and effectual,
or will they break up without doing any Thing to the Purpose?
I hope you will not have as much Altercation upon the
Detail, as there was in getting the Principles of the System. .

.

.I wish you much Speed, and that you may be full of

good Works, the first mainly for my own Sake, for I dread going down again to Philad[elphia]. .... 6

Paterson's departure once the small states were protected symbolized his role at the Convention.63 The success of the Convention
depended upon an accommodation with the small states, which
Madison, Wilson, and Morris were unwilling to make. That the debate was held, that it was conducted on legal and political principles
59 C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 719. Once the small states like New Jersey had
won equality, they were strong supporters of national power. See C. RoSSITER, supra
note 2, at 196; see also C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 310 n.1 (quoting Letter from
James Madison to Martin Van Buren (May 13, 1828)).
60 Madison's notes have Paterson as saying, in debate with Madison and
Gouverneur Morris on July 7th, "For himself he should vote [against] the Report,
because it yielded too much." 1 RECORDS, supra note 31, at 551. King's notes also
report Paterson as saying, "Ithink I shall vote [against] the Report." Id. at 554. In
any event, Paterson's words appear in the context to be a debating tactic.
Paterson's July 16th tactics on adjournment are cited by Warren and seem to
have influenced Rossiter, who quotes the entire exchange. See C. RossrrER, supra
note 2, at 194-95; C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 311-12; see also supra notes 53-55 and
accompanying text. O'Connor, however, correctly reads this as maneuvers by Randolph to upset the Compromise and by Paterson to protect it. See J. O'CONNOR,
supra note 1, at 156-58.
61 J.O'CONNOR, supra note 1, at 160; 4 RECORDS, supra note 57, at 70.
62 4 RECORDS, supra note 57, at 73; seeJ. O'CONNOR, supra note 1, at 161.
63 Clinton Rossiter, appraising each of the Framers, calls Paterson "the stubborn and successful advocate of state equality, whose departure in late July may
have robbed him of a much higher ranking." C. RossITER, supra note 2, at 250.
Paterson, Rossiter says, "set some sort of record for stubborn courage." Id. at 205.
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(whatever the issues of property and power concerning the Western
lands), and that it was able to continue instead of leading to the
dissolution of the Convention can be attributed in large part to Paterson, who was able to stand up to the ablest men of the Convention, such as Madison, Wilson, and Gouverneur Morris.'
The focus of Paterson's efforts, in turn, is directly traceable to
New Jersey's place in the nascent attempts to establish the bases of
American political philosophy. As a small state, New Jersey needed
a strong National Government to protect its interests. Paterson's
intimacy with New Jersey as a student, lawyer, and public official
made him acutely aware of this need. This intimacy ensured that
New Jersey and other small states would have a cogent and formidable voice speaking for them at the Convention.
Well-educated and thoughtful as he was, however, Paterson was
more the skilled common law and chancery practitioner than the
scholar or political philosopher. Yet in his own political and moral
philosophy, he was a strong advocate of stability and authority, with
these convictions often directed to securing the rights of property.
Paterson also stressed the people's compact, a principle apparently
derived from John Locke, and a theory of sovereignty that bore echoes of Thomas Hobbes and may have owed much to William Blackstone.6" In his later arguments supporting the Constitution and in
his work on the Supreme Court, Paterson was an outspoken Federalist or nationalist. No fundamental change in Paterson's views
seems to have been necessary, only the kind of development shared
by most of the Founders. He was, from his experience, a true Federalist, seeking national, sovereign power while retaining an important role for the states, which would remain "sovereign" in the
exercise of their own non-national powers.
One also senses about Paterson a certain underlying modesty
and rectitude about his duties. OnJuly 17th, when he saw that the
Compromise would hold, his contribution to the Convention was
sufficient; it was time to return home to his family and his law practice in New Jersey. What Paterson had done was to furnish the
strong but moderate opposition that the great plan of Madison required. If the Constitution were to be proposed and adopted, it was
not only essential that the small states be protected; it was also criti64 Rossiter notes that the Constitution and its federal structure were at stake in
the battle between "prideful Virginia and tenacious New Jersey." Id.
65

See L. ROSENBERG,

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF WILLIAM PATERSON 43-50,

180

(1967). Rosenberg emphasizes the influence of Locke. Id.; see also 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 712 (1938) (noting Blackstone's influence in
the American Colonies).

322

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:313

cal that the Convention itself be a means for argument, debate, and
compromise. Paterson's first argument on June 9th raised the question of representation. Then the New Jersey plan created the vehicle for the great debate. It is significant that Paterson was elected to
the Committee of Compromise, while Madison, Wilson, and
Gouverneur Morris were not. One can only speculate about what
might have happened to the Convention if the small states had not
been represented by a skillful, determined, and courageous advocate who was, at base, in agreement with Madison, Washington, and
the other nationalists.
III.

THE JUDICIARY ACT OF

1789

New Jersey was the third state to ratify the Constitution.6 6
By August 1788, the required nine states had done so. 6 7 On November 25, 1788, William Paterson was chosen by a joint session
of the legislature to be one of New Jersey's two Senators.6 8 He
took his seat in the Senate on March 19, 1789 in New York City.
On April 7th, the Senate appointed a committee "to 'bring in a
bill for organizing the judiciary of the United States.' "69 Paterson was appointed to this committee, which produced the Judiciary Act of 1789.70
The first nine sections of the Judiciary Act of 1789 were in
William Paterson's handwriting. 71 Almost identical to the
printed version, the handwritten draft discovered by Charles
Warren 72 led' 73to a reappraisal of Paterson's contribution to this
"great law."
Oliver Ellsworth chaired the committee and is
considered to have been the leading draftsman, but Paterson
played a considerable role. 4
66 C. WARREN, supra note 2, at 768.
67 J. O'CONNOR, supra note 1, at 167-68.

68 Id. at 168.
69 Id. at 169.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 170.

72 See Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV.
L. REV. 49, 50-51, 60 (1923); see also 1J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 463-65. Goebel believes that the manuscript discovered by Warren must be distinguished from
an undiscovered "finished version" from which the bill was then printed. Id. at
465. Goebel's comparison of the actual draft and the printed bill does show a few
small differences. See id. at 465-66 n.28. For a reproduction of the first page of
Paterson's handwritten draft, see id. at 464.
73 See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 4
(1927).
74 1J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 459;J. O'CONNOR, supra note 1, at 169-71; 1
C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 8-9 (1922).
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While the House was considering the constitutional amendments that became the Bill of Rights, the Senate was undertaking
to establish the Federal courts. The select committee numbered
ten (half of the Senate), among whom Ellsworth, Paterson, and
Caleb Strong were the leading lawyers.75 In addition, Ellsworth
and Paterson were the principal drafters.76 Paterson, from his
practice of law in New Jersey, had the most extensive experience
in both the common law and the equity or chancery jurisdiction
for which New Jersey was noted.77
In the first nine sections, written by Paterson and enacted
into law, the bill stated: "Be it enacted by the Senate and representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Supreme Court of the United States shall consist
of a chief justice and five associate justices, any four of whom
shall be a quorum ....*78 The next paragraph provided as follows: "And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That
the United States shall be, and they hereby are divided into
eleven districts ... ."179
The provision for United States district and circuit courts, in
Paterson's hand, was of primary importance. The new Federal
Government had fashioned "its own judicial machinery for enforcing its claims and safeguarding its agents against the obstructions and prejudices of local authorities."80 Important matters
such as financing the Government, commerce among the states,
and foreign trade would be facilitated by the Federal courts.8 1
The division of the country into districts recognized the interests of the states. Each Federal district had a district court and
was made coextensive with the geographic boundaries of a state,
helping to ease the apprehension, as Goebel puts it, that the Federal courts would obliterate those of the states."2 Secondly, except for admiralty, the jurisdiction of the district courts was
narrowly limited, 3 and the original jurisdiction of the circuit
75 1J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 458-59.

Warren, supra note 72, at 50.
1 J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 459.
Id. at 469.
79 Id.; see also id. at 464 (Paterson's handwritten manuscript).
80 F. FRANKFURTER &J. LANDIS, supra note 73, at 10.
81 Id. at 7-11. For a summary and appraisal of the Act, see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN,
D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 32-36 (2d ed. 1973).
82 See I J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 471.
83 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77.
76
77
78
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courts, while broader, was carefully defined.8 4
The famous section 25 provided for review by the Supreme
Court, through writs of error, of the judgments of the highest
courts of the states in law or equity when Federal questions were
involved.8 5 It was Paterson who had introduced the supremacy
clause during the Convention as part of the New Jersey plan.8 6
Section 25, "perhaps the boldest" section of the Judiciary Act,
was an essential implementation of this clause. 87 As Laurence
Tribe puts it, the Judiciary Act gave the Supreme Court the
' 88
power "to review federal question decisions of state courts.
The Supreme Court later concluded that the Constitution gave it
the power to accept such review.8 9 In addition, section 34 of the
Act provided that state laws would furnish the rules of decision in
common law trials in the courts of the United States.9"
Paterson, with his unusual combination of nationalism and
concern for the states, must have been a force on the committee
for both national power and the integrity of the states. Because
he was the most widely experienced lawyer on the panel, the
more technical aspects of the bill must also have owed much to
him. It is unnecessary to detract from Ellsworth's leadership in
order to recognize this. Paterson's drafting of the first nine sections seems a good sign of the importance of his contribution to
the Judiciary Act.
In short, the Judiciary Act of 1789 established the system of
Federal courts, and Oliver Ellsworth and William Paterson were
its principal authors. Of the Act itself, Frankfurter and Landis
have written:
The Act has three claims to greatness. It devised a judicial
organization which, with all its imperfections, served the country substantially unchanged for nearly a century. Through supervision over state courts conferred upon the Supreme Court
by its famous Section Twenty-five, the Act created one of the
84 See id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78-79. See generally F. FRANKFURTER &J. LANDIS, supra
note 73, at 12.
85 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (1982)).
86 M. FARRAND, supra note 2, at 85.
87 IJ. GOEBEL, JR.,supra note 3, at 480-81; 1 C. WARREN, supra note 74, at 10-11.
88 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 3-4, at 27 (1978); see G. GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw

29 (11 th ed. 1985).

89 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 342 (1816).
90 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92. Section 34 was not in the
bill as drafted. It was, however, introduced in the Senate debate. Its original version was in Ellsworth's hand, as Charles Warren discovered. I J. GOEBEL, JR., supra
note 3, at 502 & n.149.
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most important nationalizing influences in the formative period of the Republic. But the transcendent achievement of the
First Judiciary Act is the establishment for this country of the
tradition of a system of inferior federal courts. 91

IV.

PATERSON'S WORK ON THE SUPREME COURT

In 1790, when Governor Livingston died, William Paterson
was chosen by the legislature to be New Jersey's second governor.9 2 Then, in 1793, George Washington appointed Paterson to
the Supreme Court of the United States.93 Paterson was to serve
on the Court until his death in 1806, 9' but there was also other
evidence of his position and influence in the new Nation. In
1795, Washington, who had presided at the Constitutional Convention, offered Paterson the office of Secretary of State, but he
declined. 95 Before Oliver Ellsworth was appointed Chief Justice
in 1796, published reports indicated that the promotion of Justice Paterson was imminent.9 6 In 1800, Paterson was the candidate of the Senate for the Chief Justiceship, but the Senators
yielded to Adams's determination to appoint John Marshall.9 7
In the early days of the Supreme Court, nearly every case
established precedent. As in the Convention, therefore, the way
to follow Paterson's work is chronologically, and Paterson's
Supreme Court opinions will be discussed in the order in which
they were written. Paterson also presided in the circuit courts,
most notably at two trials for treason arising from the Whiskey
Rebellion 9" and at two trials for violation of the alien and sedition laws. 99 It suffices to say that in the treason cases, Paterson
carefully delineated the elements of proof of treason,' 0 0 and in
91 F. FRANKFURTER &J. LANDIS, supra note 73, at 4.

92 J. O'CONNOR, supra note 1, at xii, 185.
93 Id. at 223. As governor and chancellor of New Jersey, Paterson undertook a
complete compilation and revision of New Jersey statutory law; he completed the
work while on the Supreme Court. See id. at 202-22.
94 See id. at 278.
95 Id. at 238.
96 1 C. WARREN, supra note 74, at 140.
97 J. O'CONNOR, supra note 1, at 260.

98 United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346 (Paterson, Circuit Justice 1795);
United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348 (Paterson, Circuit Justice 1795).
99 1 J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 638-39; 1 C. WARREN, supra note 74, at 16465; see F. WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 333-44, 684-87 (Philadelphia 1849). See generally
Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (repealed 1801); Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66,
1 Stat. 577 (1798) (repealed 1801).
100 See United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346, 346-47 (Paterson, CircuitJus-
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the sedition trials, Paterson took a severe, federalist position.'"'
The importance of Paterson's work on the Supreme Court
paralleled the importance of the early Court in preparing the way
for the great cases of the Marshall era. From reading the early
opinions and from the assessments of historians of the early
Court, this work appears to have been an indispensable prelude. 10 2 William Paterson's opinions show that he was both a
skillful lawyer on the bench and an articulate exponent of national power, including the power ofjudicial review. In fact, Paterson's charge to the jury in Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrancel0 3 served
as one of the most important justifications of judicial review in
the early years. Nevertheless, to the reader today, there is a
somewhat unformed quality to these early cases, not only because the opinions of the Justices were delivered separately, or
seriatim, but also because the great cases would take time to develop. On the Supreme Court, Paterson, who had been the right
age for leadership in the Revolutionary War and the Constitutional Convention, would help to prepare the way for younger
men like John Marshall, Joseph Story, and others.
When William Paterson joined the Supreme Court in the
February Term of 1794, the early Federal judiciary had begun to
win some measure of public confidence.' 0 4 Paterson's first full
opinion appears in Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators,'0 5 the most
important of three cases decided in the February Term of
tice 1795); United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348, 355-56 (Paterson, Circuit
Justice 1795). See generally L. BALDWIN, WHISKEY REBELS 262-64 (1939); Hurst,
Treason in the United States, 58 HARV. L. REV. 226 (1944).
101 See 1 J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 637-39; F. WHARTON, supra note 99, at
334-42, 684-87.
102 See l J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 722-93; 1 C. WARREN, supra note 74, at 31,
65-84, 91-168. But see 2 G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15,
at 7, 13-14 (198 1). Haskins terms the early Court "[a] relatively feeble institution,"
ascribing its real beginning to Marshall. Id. Nonetheless, Haskins also states that
"[b]y this date [1801], the Supreme Court had already upheld and extended Federalist principles of nationalization and centralization; and under Marshall's leadership it would continue much further in that direction." Id. at 147.
103 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (Paterson, CircuitJustice 1795).
104 1 C. WARREN, supra note 74, at 65. Confidence in the Federal bench had
eroded as a result of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). That case
had upheld the right of a citizen of South Carolina to sue the State of Georgia. Id.
at 479 (opinion ofJay, CJ.). The Chisholm rule was promptly repealed by a constitutional amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See generally 1 C. WARREN, supra
note 74, at 91-99.
105 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795).
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1795.106 In 1777, Congress formed a standing committee of five
members to hear appeals from the state admiralty courts in cases
of capture. 0 7 That same year, the brig M'Clary captured the brig
Susanna, and the owners of the M'Clary, Penhallow and others,
successfully brought a libel in the New Hampshire courts to have
the Susanna declared a lawful prize.10 8 The New Hampshire Superior Court affirmed the judgment." 9 In 1778, the Susanna's
owners, Doane and others, appealed to Congress, and in 1779,
the standing committee determined that it had jurisdiction to decide the controversy."10 In 1780, however, Congress directed
that "all appeals in cases of capture, now depending before Congress, or the Commissioners of Appeals" be adjudicated by the
newly created "Court of Appeals in cases of capture" established
by the Articles of Confederation.' I That court in 1783 reversed
the decrees of the New Hampshire court and declared in favor of
the Susanna's owners." 12 In 1794, a United States circuit court
decree enforced thatjudgment.' 13 The owners of the M'Clary appealed on the ground that the New Hampshire courts had exclusive jurisdiction of the cause.' '4
Paterson narrated the facts of the case," 1 5 and he then delivered the first and longest of the opinions affirming the decree of
the circuit court." 16 He stated that the issue was one of the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of Appeal and the Court of Appeals, and that this issue turned upon the competency of
Congress to authorize these tribunals."l 7 He held that Congress
possessed such authority:
Congress was the general, supreme, and controuling [sic]
council of the nation, the centre of union, the centre of force,
and the sun of the political system. To determine what their
powers were, we must enquire what powers they exercised.
Congress raised armies, [and] fitted out a navy. . . . These
high acts of sovereignty were submitted to, acquiesced in, and
106 The Court also decided United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 42 (1795),
and Bingham v. Cabbot, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 19 (1795), during that Term.
107 Penhallow, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 60.
108 Id. at 60-61.
109 Id. at 61.
11O Id.
I' Id. at 62.

Id.
Id. at 64.
''4 Id.
112
113

115 See id. at 54-66.
116 See id. at 79-89 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
117 Id. at 79-80 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
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approved of, by the people of America. . . . In every government, whether it consists of many states, or of a few, or
whether it be of a federal or consolidated nature, there must
be a supreme power or will. . . . The truth is, that the States,
individually, were not known nor recognized as sovereign, by
foreign nations, nor are they now; the States collectively,
under Congress, as the connecting point, or head, were acknowledged by foreign powers as sovereign, particularly in
that acceptation of the term, which is applicable to all great
national concerns . ... 118
Paterson also stated: "Besides, every body must be amenable to the
authority under which he acts." '1 19 The captain of the M'Clary had
been commissioned as a privateer by Congress. 120 Therefore, "[the
captain] must ultimately be responsible to Congress, or their constituted authority." 1 2 '
The other Justices expressed a narrower view of the powers of
the Continental Congress, though agreeing that the states had given
22
to Congress external sovereignty sufficient for the present case.'
Justice Blair noted the argument that New Hampshire could revoke
the authority it had given to Congress and said that a satisfactory
answer was made to this: if the state had the right, it was never
23
exercised. 1
An overriding issue in the early Federal courts was their power
to review state acts and, especially, acts of Congress. 1 24 Paterson
had introduced the supremacy clause of the Constitution during the
Id. at 80-81 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
119 Id. at 81 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
118

Id.
Id. Goebel comments that "Paterson, who knew very well what the actual
political conditions had been, was evidently transported by his own rhetoric." 1 J.
GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 768.
120
121

See, e.g., Penhallow, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 94-95 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
Id. at 112-13 (opinion of Blair, J.). Paterson's view of sovereignty played a
role in the case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936). Justice Sutherland's opinion drew upon Paterson's Penhallow opinion for
the doctrine that in the foreign relations field, the Federal Government possesses
inherent rather than enumerated powers. Id. at 316-17, 319. The argument made
was that a Congressional resolution authorizing the President to declare an arms
embargo constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Id. at 314.
Sutherland answered by stating that the proposition that the Government can exercise only such express and implied powers as are granted to it applies only to internal affairs. Id. at 315-16. But see 1 J.GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 768 & n.29
(Supreme Court's argument in Curtiss-Wright was "historically indefensible").
124 See 1J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 589-92; 2 G.HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra
note 102, at 186-91. According to Goebel, this power was not questioned in the
earliest years. See 1 J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 590.
122
123
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Convention as part of the New Jersey plan. 125 In addition, Oliver
Ellsworth and William Paterson had co-authored in the Senate the
Judiciary Act of 1789.126 Section 25 of that Act gave to the Federal
judiciary not only the power to pass upon state legislation, but also
the power to reverse or affirm a decision
of a state court passing
12 7
upon the validity of an act of Congress.
In the April Term of 1795, Justice Paterson, sitting in the Pennsylvania District of the United States Circuit Court, met the issue
judicially for the first time. 128 The Vanhorne's Lessee case involved
conflicting claims of title to Pennsylvania land in the possession of
the defendant. 129 The plaintiff based his claim on a chain of title
from the proprietors of the colony; the defendant based his on the
claim of settlers from Connecticut, whose title rested on a "quieting
and confirming act" passed by the Pennsylvania Legislature.13 0 The
Act declared title to the land to be in the settlers and recited that
those who had title to the land "who will be deprived thereof by the
operation of this act" should be compensated in equivalent lands.'13
Paterson's charge to the jury is reported. 13 2 The principal
question he considered was the constitutionality of the quieting and
confirming Act. 133 Eight years before Marbury v. Madison,'14 Paterson delivered the following charge:
What is a Constitution? It is the form of government, delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain
first principles of fundamental laws are established. The Constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of
the people, and is the supreme law of the land; it is paramount
to the power of the Legislature, and can be revoked or altered
125

text.
126
127

J.

O'CONNOR,

supra note 1, at 146; see supra notes 28-40 and accompanying

See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.

128 See Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 304 (Paterson, Circuit Justice 1795).
129 Id. at 304-05.

130
131

Id. at 304-07.

Id. at 313. For the earlier history of the dispute, see I J. GOEBEL, JR., supra
note 3, at 188-94. See also L. ROSENBERG, supra note 65, at 165-66, 181. One author
described the controversy as "[a] few wealthy Philadelphia land speculators with
paper titles in their pockets . . . arrayed against several thousand small farmers
who had brought schools, churches, and settlements to the upper Susquehanna."
Boyd, William Paterson, ForerunnerofJohn Marshall, in THE LIVES OF EIGHTEEN FROM
PRINCETON 16 (W. Thorp ed. 1946). The dispute had been dragging on for 25
years and was extremely bitter. Id.
132 See Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 307-20.
133 See id. at 307-16.
134 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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only by the authority that made it. . . . What are Legislatures? Creatures of the Constitution; they owe their existence
to the Constitution; they derive their powers from the Constitution; It is their commission; and, therefore, all their acts
must be conformable to it, or else they will be void. The Constitution is the work or will of the People themselves, in their
original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity. Law is the work or
will of the Legislature in their derivative and subordinate capacity. The one is the work of the Creator, and the other of the
Creature. The Constitution fixes limits to the exercise of legislative authority, and prescribes the orbit within which it must
move. In short, gentlemen, the Constitution is the sun of the
political system, around which all Legislative, Executive and
Judicial bodies must revolve. Whatever may be the case in
other countries, yet in this there can be no doubt, that every
act of the Legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is absolutely void.' 35
Paterson concluded that the confirming Act was void because it
gave compensation for the lands taken in the form of other lands,
' 36
when "[n]o just compensation can be made except in money." 1
Therefore, the Act was a deprivation of "one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man"-"the right of acquiring and
possessing property"-which by the Constitution of Pennsylvania
"was made a fundamental law." '3 7 Having stated that the Act was
unconstitutional, Paterson went on to say that even if it were valid,
the settlers had failed to comply with several of its requirements. 138
Because the Act was now repealed, however, it was too late for them
139
to establish title.
It seems sufficient that this opinion or instruction stand on its
own merits. In fact, there is little evidence of its impact on the country, although works on constitutional law note it as an early statement of the doctrine of judicial review.' 4 0
In the August, 1795 Term, the Supreme Court heard two
cases. 4 ' A long opinion by Paterson appears in Talbot v. Janson.'4 2
135 Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 308.
136

137
138
139
140

Id. at 315; see id. at 316.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 317-18.
Id. at 319-20.

E.g., IJ. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 590; 1 C. WARREN, supra note 74, at 69.
Boyd says that the landowners who filled the courtroom printed Paterson's charge
in pamphlet form and distributed it throughout the Nation. Boyd, supra note 131,
at 17. Goebel confirms this. 1 J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 590 & n.177.
141 Talbot v.Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795); United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 121 (1795).
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The chief question raised there, although unnecessary to the eventual resolution of the case,' 4 3 was whether a citizen of Virginia, one
Ballard, had been expatriated.' 4 4 Ballard had been commissioned
as a privateer by the French and had captured a Dutch brig.' 4 5 If he
had remained a United States citizen, his commission was invalid
6
and the capture illegal.'

4

TheJustices agreed that in any event, the initial outfitting of the
brig in Charleston was done in violation of Federal law, and hence
the subsequent capture was tainted with illegality.' 4 7 Paterson and
Iredell, however, also discussed the question of expatriation and
concluded that Ballard had not lost his United States citizenship. 148
One section of Paterson's opinion is noteworthy for the picture of
the Federal system that it presents. In rejecting the proposition that
the Virginia law on expatriation could operate on United States citizenship, Paterson said:
The sovereignties are different; the allegiance is different. .

.

. We have sovereignties moving within a sovereignty.

Of course there is complexity and difficulty in the system,
which requires a penetrating eye fully to explore, and steady
and masterly hands to keep in unison and order. A slight collision may disturb the harmony of the parts, and endanger the
machinery of the whole.' 4 9
In the February Term of 1796, the important cases of Hylton v.
United States'5 0 and Ware v. Hylton '51 were decided. The first is famous as holding that a tax on the use of carriages was not a direct
tax. 152 It was also the first instance in which the Supreme Court

passed upon the constitutionality of a Federal law.' 53 Paterson's
opinion in Hylton was the second in series; Justice Chase had been
appointed recently, and as junior member, he gave the first opinion. 154 Chase stated that the issue was whether " '[a]n act to lay
duties upon carriages, for the conveyance of persons,' is unconstitu142 3 U.s. (3 Dali.) 133 (1795).
143 Id. at 169 (opinion of Rutledge, C.J.).
144 Id. at 152-53 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
145
146

Id. at 133-34.
See id.

147 Id. at 154-55 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
148 Id. at 152-54 (opinion of Paterson, J.); see id. at 161-65 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
Justice Iredell discussed the expatriation of the plaintiff, William Talbot. Id.

Id. at 154 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796) [hereinafter cited as Hylton].
151 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) [hereinafter cited as Ware].
152 Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 180 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
153 1 C. WARREN, supra note 74, at 147.
154 Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 172-75 (opinion of Chase, J.).
149
150
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tional and void[.]"' 5 5 The taxpayer's argument was that the tax was
a direct tax, and was therefore void because it was not apportioned
among the states as the Constitution required. 15 6 The threejustices
rendering opinions, Chase, Paterson, and Iredell, agreed that the
tax was not direct.' 5 7 Chase added that because it was not direct, it
was unnecessary to determine "whether this court, constitutionally
possesses the power to declare an act of Congress void." 58 Neither
Paterson nor Iredell expressed any such doubt. At the beginning of
Paterson's opinion, he stated: "If it be a direct tax, it is unconstitutional, because it has been laid pursuant to the rule of uniformity,
' 59
and not to the rule of apportionment."'
The Justices agreed that since the carriage tax would not admit
160
of apportionment, it must be an indirect rather than a direct tax.
In the words of Iredell, "it is evident that the Constitution contemplated none as direct but such as could be apportioned."'16 ' Paterson,
however, analyzed the nature of the tax itself. He stated:
All taxes on expences or consumption are indirect taxes. A
tax on carriages is of this kind, and of course is not a direct tax.
Indirect taxes are circuitous modes of reaching the revenue of
individuals, who generally live according to their income. In
many cases of this nature the individual may be said to tax
himself. I shall close the discourse62with reading a passage or
two from Smith's Wealth of Nations. 1
Paterson then quoted Adam Smith's proposition that the state, finding it impossible to tax people directly in proportion to their revenue, does it indirectly by taxing their expenses through a levy upon
the consumable commodities for which they pay out their
income. 163
In Ware, the second landmark case decided during the Febru155 Id. at 172 (opinion of Chase, J.).

Id. at 172-73 (opinion of Chase, J.).
157 Id. at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.); id. at 180 (opinion of PatersonJ.); id. at 183
(opinion of Iredell, J.).
158 Id. at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.).
159 Id. at 176 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
160 Id. at 181 (opinion of IredellJ.).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 180 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
163 Id. at 180-81 (opinion of Paterson, J.). "Paterson had been present at the
Federal Convention when the rule of apportionment of taxes as well as representation was decided. He was thus qualified to speak with some assurance about the
intentions of that body." 1 J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 781. In his opinion in
Hylton, Paterson also said: "It is not necessary to determine, whether a tax on the
product of land be a direct or indirect tax. Perhaps, the immediate product of land,
in its original and crude state, ought to be considered as the land itself. . . .Land,
156
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ary, 1796 Term, the Court declared the supremacy of the treaty
power over state law and held that a clause in the Treaty of 1783
providing for recovery of debts owed British creditors nullified a
Virginia law that had confiscated those debts." 6 Of the four opinions, Justice Iredell's furnished the most extended discussion of the
nature of the treaty power.' 6 5 Paterson's opinion was devoted principally to the meaning of the treaty itself, ending on the note that
commercial contracts should be inviolable even in wartime. 16 6 Paterson also stated that "[t]he construction of a treaty made . . . for
the restoration and enforcement
of pre-existing contracts, ought to
67
be liberal and benign."'

1

Justice Paterson's next significant opinion appeared in Calder v.
Bull,' 6 8 a 1798 decision. The Connecticut Legislature had passed a
law setting aside a decree of the probate court, which had invalidated a will.' 6 ' The law also granted a new trial.' 70 On appeal from
the new trial, which upheld the will, the Connecticut law was attacked as ex post facto. 17 1 The Supreme Court of Errors of Con1 72
necticut rejected this argument and affirmed the second decree.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Connecticut court.173 TheJustices agreed that only penal and criminal statutes could be ex post facto laws and that the Constitutional
independently of its produce, is of no value." Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) at 176-77
(opinion of Paterson, J.).
Justice Fuller's opinion in the income tax case, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, afdon reh'g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), quoted this, and Fuller
appears to have relied heavily upon Paterson's notion that land and its product are
identical in order to justify his holding that a tax on the income from land is a direct
tax on the land itself. Id. at 581, 583. Fuller stated: "This law taxes the income
received from land and the growth or produce of the land. Justice Paterson observed in Hylton's case, 'land, independently of its produce, is of no value;' and
certainly had no thought that direct taxes were confined to unproductive land." Id.
at 581 (quoting Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.)). The dissenting opinion in Pollock, however, pointed out that Paterson had also stated that
"[he] never entertained a doubt that the principal ... objects that the framers of
the Constitution contemplated as falling within the rule of apportionment were a
capitation tax and a tax on land.' " Id. at 640 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Hylton,
3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.)).
164 Ware, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 244-45 (opinion of Chase, J.).
165 Id. at 271-79 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
166 Id. at 255 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
167 Id. at 256 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
168 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798).
169 Id. at 386 (opinion of Chase, J.).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 386-87 (opinion of Chase, J.).
172 Id. at 386 (opinion of Chase, J.).
173 Id. at 401.
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prohibition does not extend to retroactive civil laws.' 7 4 Chase's
opinion was again the first and seems to be the most frequently
cited. 7- Paterson stated that his decision was made despite "an ardent desire to have extended the provision . . . to retrospective

laws in general," since such laws do not accord with "the fundamental principles of the social compact."' 1 76 Nevertheless, he was con77
vinced that ex post facto provisions were limited to criminal laws.1
Calder was the first case to review state legislation on a writ of
error to a state court. Ware, which had declared a state law invalid as
in conflict with the treaty power, and Fletcher v. Peck,1 78 which was to
be the first decision in which the Supreme Court held a state law
violative of a provision of the Federal Constitution, 1 79 came before
the Supreme Court from Federal circuit courts. 8 ° The Calder
Court, in reviewing the decision of the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut, tacitly expressed not only the rule of Fletcher, but also
the power to review state court decisions,' 8 ' which was promulgated
by Story 3in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee' 8 2 and Marshall in Cohens v.
Virginia. 18

Paterson's contribution to this important question was not limited to his participation in Calder, however. The power to review
state court decisions on Federal questions was conferred on the
Supreme Court by the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of
1789, which Ellsworth and Paterson had co-authored.' 8 4 It was the
validity of this section that was challenged and upheld in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee and Cohens v. Virginia.
There were no opinions by Paterson among the three Supreme
Court decisions rendered in 1799. In 1800, Paterson gave opinions
in Cooper v. Telfair 185 and Bas v. Tingy.' 8 6 In Cooper, it was contended
174 See id. at 390-91 (opinion of Chase, J.); id. at 397 (opinion of Paterson, J.); id.
at 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
175 See, e.g., I J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 3, at 704-05.
176 Id. at 397 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
177

Id.

178

10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).

179

See id. at 139.

180 See id. at 87; Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 199.
181 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
182 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
183 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
184 See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. Paterson's co-authorship of the
Judiciary Act has had more effect than all of his decisions. Warren quotes John C.
Calhoun as stating that without the Judiciary Act of 1789, the entire course of the
Federal Government would have been altered. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 74, at 18.
185 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800).
186 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
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that an Act of the Georgia Legislature that had confiscated Cooper's
estate for treason was an unconstitutional exercise of the judicial
power by the legislature and also constituted a denial of the right to
a trial by jury.187 The Justices found nothing in the Georgia Constitution prohibiting the Act, and Paterson added:
[W]herever the legislative power of a government is undefined,
it includes the judicial and executive attributes. . . . [T]he
power of confiscation and banishment . . . is a power, that

grows out of the very nature of the social compact, which must
reside somewhere, and which is so inherent in the legislature,
that it cannot be divested, or 88transferred, without an express
provision of the constitution.'
In Bas, Congress had provided that if a ship should be recaptured from "the enemy" after being in the captor's hands for more
than ninety-six hours, one-half instead of one-eighth salvage would
be earned.'8 9 An American ship had been recaptured from the
French under these conditions, but its owners claimed that France
was not an "enemy" because war had not been declared.'9 0 The
Justices, including Paterson, agreed in separate opinions that the
limited hostilities authorized by Congress against France qualified
her as an enemy and that therefore a "limited" war was being conducted at sea.' 9 '
John Marshall joined the Supreme Court as ChiefJustice in the
August Term, 1801.192 Marshall's practice of writing the opinions
for the Court necessarily relegated Paterson and the other Justices
to a relatively obscure role.' 9 3 On one important occasion, however, Paterson wrote the opinion for the Court, Marshall having disqualified himself. The case was Stuart v. Laird,19 4 decided less than a
week after Marbury in 1803. In 1802, Congress repealed the Federalists'Judiciary Act of 180 1,9' which had created sixteen new circuit
court judgeships and had also relieved the Supreme Court Justices
of their circuit-riding duties.' 96 The repealer by the Republican
U.S. (4 DalI.) at 16-17.
188 Id. at 19 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
189 Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 37; see Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 24, § 7, 1 Stat. 709, 716
187 See Cooper, 4

(repealed 1800).
190 Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 38.
191 Id. at 43 (opinion of Chase, J.); see id. at 45-46 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
192 See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
193 2 G. HASKINS & H. JOHNsoN, supra note 102, at 105, 382-86.
194 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). Marshall had decided the case below. Id. at
308.
195 2 G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 102, at 163-68.
196 See id. at 122-33.
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Congress, the Judiciary Act of 1802, was passed over the opposition's claim that Congress had no power to destroy the judgeships it
had created.' 9 7 Stuart decided this question.
At issue was the transfer of a case from the Fourth Circuit to the
Fifth, made pursuant to the Act of 1802, which had abolished the
Fourth Circuit court.' 9 8 The appellant contended that the transfer
in question could not take place because the Act was unconstitutional. 199 Congress had no constitutional power to destroy the circuit courts, it was argued, if it thereby deprived a judge of his office,
because the Constitution placed the Federal judges beyond the
reach of the legislative and executive powers. 200 The appellant also
claimed that the Act had unconstitutionally assigned Supreme Court
Justices to circuit court duty because the Constitution vested only
appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.2 0 '
Paterson wrote a very brief opinion. He dealt first with the argument raised against the transfer, and stated merely that "Congress have [sic] constitutional authority to establish from time to
time such inferior tribunals as they may think proper; and to transfer a cause from one such tribunal to another. ' 20 2 The present case,
he held, was nothing more than such a transfer. 20 3 This short rejection or avoidance of the argument raised by the Federalists not only
established Congress's power in this field, but disposed of an especially dangerous threat to the Court's power. 20 4 The Republicans
were in no mood to submit to an attempt to void the Act.20 5
Paterson's answer to the second argument-that the Justices
could not ride circuit-established an important principle of constitutional construction. He stated:
To this objection, which is of recent date, it is sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence under it for a period of
several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed
the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the
197 Id. at 163-68. The argument of the Federalists resulted in the famous debate
in Congress over the power of the Supreme Court to review acts of Congress. 1 C.
WARREN, supra note 74, at 215-22.
198 Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 302-03.
199 Id. at 303.
200 Id. at 304.
201 Id. at 305.
202 Id. at 309.
203 Id.
204 See 2 G. HASKINS

& H. JOHNSON, supra note 102, at 217, 650; 1 C.
supra note 74, at 269-73.
205 See 1 C. WARREN, supra note 74, at 269-73.
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most forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong
and obstinate to be shaken or controlled. Of course, the question is at rest, and ought not now to be disturbed.20 6
When Marshall disqualified himself in a few other cases, the
other Justices delivered opinions in series.20 7 Paterson's opinions
appear in these, but none of them are of special importance. Paterson voted with Marshall in Marbury, and he concurred in the other
opinions by Marshall with one exception.20 8 His relationship with
Marshall appears to have been a cordial one during the period they
served together. Paterson's last opinion was delivered in Randolph
V. Ware,20 9 the last case reported for the February Term, 1806. His
was the longest and most detailed of the separate opinions, which
dealt with a breach of a promise to insure. 1 0
The title page of Cranch's report for the February Term of
1807 lists a new Justice, Brockholst Livingston, appointed "in the
place of the honourable WILLIAM PATERSON, deceased."' 2 1 1 Paterson
had become ill during the summer recess.2 12 He died on September
9, 1806.213
William Paterson's thirteen years on the Supreme Court
capped, in a quiet way, the great work and themes of his political
life. There was, first, the new system of national power, with the
states operating as "sovereignties within a sovereignty." Paterson
consistently supported an extensive national power. Although the
states retained the inherent powers of government, they remained
subject to Federal law. Thus, the doctrines of judicial review of
state laws and of acts of Congress were necessary elements of national sovereignty and constitutional government.
Behind Paterson's constitutional theories of power and sovereignty was a constant awareness of the principle upon which the
Revolution had been fought and the Constitution established: the
compact or consent of the people. The Constitution was the
supreme law of the land not because it said so, but because the people had created it. "What is a Constitution?" Paterson asked the
jury in Vanhorne's Lessee. 2 14 "It is the form of government, delineated
206 Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 309.
207 See 2 G. HASKINS & H. JoHNSON, supra note 102, at 382-86.
208 Simms v. Slacum, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 300, 309-11 (1806)

dissenting).
209 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 503 (1806).
210 See id. at 510-13 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
211 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) xiii (1807).
212 J. O'CONNOR, supra note 1, at 278.
213 Id. at xiii.
214 Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 308.

(Paterson, J.,
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by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles of
fundamental laws are established.' '215
Paterson's devotion to law, property, authority, and stability
and his Federalist view of the judicial role were tempered, one
thinks on reading his opinions, by his experience at constitutionmaking in New Jersey and in the Convention of 1787. The Constitution, he continued in Vanhorne's Lessee, "is the work or will of the
People themselves, in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity. . . . In short, gentlemen, the Constitution is the sun of the
political system, around which all Legislative, Executive and Judicial
bodies must revolve." 2'1 6 Thus, for William Paterson, no branch of
government, including the judicial, was master of the Constitution.217 The Constitution belonged to the people in their sovereign
capacity.
Id.
Id.
See 2 G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 102, at 650. Marbury v. Madison
and Stuart v. Laird "presaged the development of a full-scale concept of rule of law
and a deep-seated respect for the primacy of legislative power as well as for the
concept of separation of powers." Id.
215
216
217

